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THE COSTS OF A “FREE” EDUCATION:
THE IMPACT OF SCHAFFER V. WEAST AND
ARLINGTON V. MURPHY ON LITIGATION
UNDER THE IDEA
KELLY D. THOMASON†
ABSTRACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act guarantees to
children with disabilities the right to receive a “free appropriate public
education.” This Note argues that the Supreme Court decisions
Schaffer v. Weast and Arlington v. Murphy, cases dealing with
procedural aspects of the Act, undermine a prior trend in IDEA
litigation—a trend that had increased the substantive and procedural
rights of children with disabilities. Considered together, the Schaffer
and Arlington decisions ignore the realities of the litigation process
and impose significant burdens on parents attempting to ensure that
their children receive the free appropriate education to which they are
entitled.

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education1 proclaimed the profound importance of education,
recognizing it as a right that must be “made available to all on equal
2
terms”:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our most

Copyright © 2007 by Kelly D. Thomason.
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thank Professor Jane Wettach for introducing me to this topic and reading early drafts of this
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1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. Id. at 493.
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basic public responsibilities . . . . It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
3
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.

Despite this emphatic language, the majority of special needs
4
children in the United States did not receive any form of public
education for more than fifteen years after Brown.5 Before the 1970s,
parents were left to pay for private educational services for their
special needs children or forego educational opportunities
altogether.6 Those few special needs children who were educated in
public schools received inadequate educations and were isolated from
7
other students at these schools.
8
As of 2006, more than 6.5 million children, nearly 14 percent of
the total student population, received special education services in
9
public school systems in the United States. These services were
provided under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
10
(IDEA). The IDEA provides a basic framework within which each

3. Id.
4. The terms “special needs children” and “special education students” are used
interchangeably throughout this Note to indicate children with disabilities who are provided
with services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
5. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (Supp.
IV 2004) (stating that before the enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
in 1975, the educational needs of special education students were not met and “the children
were excluded entirely from the public school system and from being educated with their
peers”). The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA) was later amended to
become the IDEA. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (Supp. IV 2004) (originally enacted as The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 774
(1975)).
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (“[A] lack of adequate resources within the public system
forced families to find services outside the public school system.”).
7. See id. (Before the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, “children [with
disabilities] did not receive appropriate educational services; the children were excluded entirely
from the public school system and from being educated with their peers; [or] undiagnosed
disabilities prevented the children from having a successful educational experience.”).
8. Amicus Committee Supporting Petitioner, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct.
528 (2005), Statement of the Council of the Parent Attorneys and Advocates (Jan. 2006),
http://copaa.org/news/schaffer.html [hereinafter Amicus Committee Statement of Parent
Attorneys and Advocates].
9. THOMAS D. SNYDER, MINI-DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2006, at 8, available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007067.pdf.
10. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (Supp. IV 2004).
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state must supply special education services to its students. Its stated
purpose is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available
to them a free appropriate public education” (FAPE).12 Adopted
under Spending Clause powers, the IDEA requires states accepting
federal money for education to provide special education services to
children with disabilities.13 The IDEA’s goal—to ensure all children
receive a free appropriate public education—is accomplished by
developing an individualized education plan (IEP) for each disabled
student.14 If parents are unsatisfied with their child’s IEP, they may
15
request an impartial due process hearing. If they are still unsatisfied
with the result of that hearing, parents may appeal the decision to the
state educational agency16 or file a civil suit.17 In this way, parents have
a standardized process to ensure their children are receiving an
appropriate education in the public schools. Yet despite these
dramatic improvements in the provision of special education services,
efforts must still be taken to better protect the rights of special
education students and their parents, especially as a result of changes
in the procedural safeguards of the IDEA and its interpretation by
the Supreme Court.
Two Supreme Court decisions from October Term 2005 highlight
the ways in which seemingly minute procedural issues can
18
dramatically affect IDEA litigation. First, in Schaffer v. Weast, the
Supreme Court determined that the “burden of proof in an
administrative hearing challenging [the sufficiency of] an IEP is
properly placed upon the party seeking relief.”19 Seven months later,
in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy,20

11. Judith M. Gerber & Sheryl Dicker, Children Adrift: Addressing the Educational Needs
of New York’s Foster Children, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 1414(d). An IEP is developed by the student’s IEP team, comprised of parents,
teachers, a representative of the school district, outside consultants, and others including the
child with disability when appropriate. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). IEPs are created annually and
address the child’s present levels of functioning, annual academic goals, descriptions of special
education services and supports to be provided to the child, and other accommodations. Id.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A).
15. Id. § 1415(f).
16. Id. § 1415(g).
17. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
18. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
19. Id. at 62.
20. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006).
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the Court determined that although parents who prevail in an IDEA
action may recover “reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the[ir]
21
costs,” these costs do not include fees for the services of expert
22
witnesses.
This Note argues that although individually the decisions of
Schaffer and Arlington are justified, when considered together, they
impose overwhelming burdens on parents without considering the
realities of the litigation process. These cases departed from an
established trend in IDEA litigation and signaled a retreat from
previous efforts to increase the substantive and procedural rights of
23
parents and their children. Part I provides an overview of the history
of special education law and litigation in the United States, with
emphasis on the enactment of the IDEA, its basic provisions, and
major changes to it through a series of reauthorizations. Parts II and
III describe the Supreme Court’s decisions in Schaffer and Arlington,
respectively, and discuss the rationales and implications of each
decision. Finally, Part IV examines the combined impact of the two
cases on parents’ procedural due process rights in IDEA litigation
and concludes that the Supreme Court has placed an unreasonable
obstacle in the path of parents attempting to ensure their child
receives a free and appropriate education.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE IDEA
The IDEA embodies the legislative responses to a series of court
cases. Litigation concerning the provision of special education
services in the United States has encompassed three main phases over
several decades. The first phase, emerging in the early 1970s,
preceded the IDEA and centered on the establishment of the right to
receive a publicly funded special education.24 This phase of litigation

21. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2004).
22. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2457.
23. The one case that could be seen as an exception to this trend is Winkelman v. Parma
City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007). In Winkelman, the Supreme Court determined that
parents enjoy rights under the IDEA and therefore are entitled to prosecute claims on their
own behalf. Id. at 2006. This case, however, does not represent a wholesale reversal of the
Supreme Court’s trend of limiting parental rights. See infra note 146.
24. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the
school board had an affirmative duty to provide handicapped children with education suited to
their needs); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (holding that Pennsylvania, having undertaken to provide a free public education to all its
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led to legislative action codifying a right to special education in the
form of the IDEA’s predecessor, the Education for All Handicapped
25
Children Act of 1975 (EHA). The second wave of litigation followed
26
the enactment of the EHA, as the U.S. Supreme Court heard several
landmark cases in the 1980s and 1990s concerning its
implementation.27 These cases focused primarily on the nature of
special education services children were entitled to receive, the
responsibilities of school districts to parents, and the definition of a
“free appropriate public education.”28 IDEA litigation entered a third
phase in the 2000s, with the Supreme Court granting review of four
29
IDEA cases within two years. Before these cases, the Supreme
Court had not heard a significant case involving the IDEA in more
30
than six years. The cases in this wave of litigation have not involved
major substantive issues in the interpretation of the IDEA, but more
technical, procedural issues.31 Although these issues may not generate
much public interest, they have significant effects on the procedural
rights of parents who challenge the school district’s provision of an
appropriate public education for their special needs child.

children, could not deny mentally retarded children access to that education appropriate to their
capacities).
25. See S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975) (stating that the legislation “followed a series of
landmark court cases establishing in law the right to education for all handicapped children”).
26. At the time, the IDEA was still titled the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.
See infra Parts I.B–C.
27. See Andrew Trotter, IDEA Issues Getting Ear of High Court: Justices to Decide
Whether Parents Allowed to Represent Their Children in Court Cases, 26 EDUCATION WEEK,
Nov. 8, 2006, at 1, 23 (describing the cases of this second phase as “building blocks that still
shape interpretations of the special education law”).
28. Id.
29. The Court decided Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005), and Arlington Cent. Sch.
Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006), in the October 2005 Term. The Court followed with
Winkelman v. Parma Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007) in the October 2006 Term, and granted
certiorari in Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 127 S. Ct. 1393 (2007) for the October 2007 Term.
30. Trotter, supra note 27, at 23. Prior to Schaffer, the last Supreme Court case to focus on
an issue involving the IDEA was Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999).
See Trotter, supra note 27, at 23 (providing a timeline of all Supreme Court cases involving the
IDEA).
31. See Trotter, supra note 27, at 23 (“By contrast, the latest IDEA cases in the high court
have turned on ‘very technical, legalistic fine points that would be interesting [only] to
litigators’ . . . . [They] do not present ‘the major issues people think of when they think of
IDEA.’” (quoting Perry Zirkel, professor of education and law at Lehigh University, and Naomi
Gittens, senior lawyer at the National School Boards Association)).
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A. The Right to a Special Education
Until the early 1970s, public school systems largely ignored the
32
needs of special education students. In 1971, a landmark district
court opinion in Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania,33 (PARC), held that “[h]aving undertaken to provide a
free public education to all of its children . . . the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania may not deny any mentally retarded child access to a
free public program of education and training.”34 This case established
that the right to a free public education granted by statute to
Pennsylvanian children must be provided to all children, including
those with mental retardation or special needs.35 The court found that
expert reports indicated all mentally retarded children could benefit
from educational programs; therefore school districts must provide
programs appropriate to each child’s individual capacities.36 Although
the court did not specifically address equal protection claims, later
courts used PARC to support decisions upholding the right to a
special education on equal protection grounds.37
PARC was followed one year later by Mills v. Board of
Education,38 another district court decision finding a right to a public
education for all special education students. In 1972, parents of seven
students with disabilities filed an action after the District of
Columbia’s public school system excluded their children without a
39
hearing. The Mills court held that the denial of publicly funded
educational opportunities to special needs children violates the Due
Process Clause.40 The court also determined that procedural due
process requires the children be provided a hearing prior to exclusion
32. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2000).
33. Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
34. Id. at 1259.
35. Id. at 1259–60.
36. Id.
37. E.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 493 (D. Minn. 1974) (citing PARC as support
for the proposition that all special needs children can benefit from an education); see also
NANCY LEE JONES, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT 4 (1995), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/1995/upl-meta-crs7997/95-669A_1995May19.pdf (“The House Report noted that since the decisions in PARC and
Mills, ‘there have been 46 cases which are completed or still pending in 28 States.’ These
decisions were described as ‘a nationwide movement in both State and Federal courts . . . .’”
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 3, 10 (1975))).
38. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 806 (D.D.C. 1972).
39. Id. at 868.
40. Id. at 875.
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41
from the public schools or termination of special services. Finally,
the court rejected the school district’s contention that it lacked money
to provide this education, holding that insufficient funding cannot
excuse a state’s duty to provide a publicly supported education for a
specific group of students.42 PARC and Mills were the beginning of a
national judicial movement that established a right to education for
handicapped children and procedural due process rights when the
provision of those educational services is changed or ended.43

B. Education for All Handicapped Children Act
After the advances made by PARC and Mills, lower court cases
sprang up around the country, with litigants seeking improved
educational opportunities for special needs children.44 These cases
helped draw public attention to the unmet needs of special education
students. Congress addressed the need for improved special
education services as a result of four factors: the increased social
awareness; the holdings in PARC and Mills, which mandated the
education of children with disabilities as a constitutional requirement;
an increased realization that state and local governments could not
fund special education without federal assistance; and developing
social science theories that educating children with disabilities could
enable them to become more productive members of society.45
Congress determined that ensuring educational opportunities for
the handicapped was an essential element of the national policy of
ensuring equality for all citizens as well as a way to promote the selfsufficiency and economic contributions of individuals with
46
disabilities. Additionally, congressional findings indicated that the
needs of handicapped children were unmet because they received
47
inappropriate services or were excluded entirely from school.
Because schools were not providing adequate services, parents often

41. Id.
42. Id. at 876.
43. See S. REP. NO. 94-332, at 3 (1975) (“Since PARC and Mills there have been 46 cases
which are completed or still pending in 28 States.”).
44. Id. This report was written during the committee meetings regarding the enactment of
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, less than three years after the decision in
Mills. See id.
45. JONES, supra note 37, at 4.
46. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (Supp. IV 2004) (originally enacted as Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 774).
47. EHA § 3(b)(2)–(5).
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sought out other educational opportunities at great personal
48
expense. These findings served as the basic impetus for subsequent
congressional action. In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EHA) “to assure that all handicapped
children have available to them . . . free appropriate public
education . . . to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of
handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected,
[and] to assist states and localities [in meeting this goal].”49
Although the EHA did not explicitly set forth a substantive
standard for the education of special needs children, it laid out
50
extensive procedural requirements. The EHA required any state
education agency receiving funds through the Act to establish and
maintain procedures to protect the rights of children and their
parents.51 The EHA granted parents the right to review all records
regarding the education and placement of the child, allowed parents
to receive an independent evaluation of the child’s capabilities, and
required prior written notice whenever the school district intended to
52
change or refused to change the placement of the child.
Additionally, the EHA gave parents the right to have information
presented in their native language and the right to present any
complaints related to the provision of the child’s FAPE to the school
district.53 Further, parents were entitled to an impartial due process

48. Id. § 3(b)(6).
49. Id. § 3(c).
50. The statute defines a “free [and] appropriate education” as
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are
provided in conformity with the individualized education program [required by the
Act].
Id. § 4(a)(18). This is a standard that leaves much leeway to the states. Indeed, in the first
Supreme Court case to interpret the EHA, the Court stated that the Act “leaves to the States
the primary responsibility for developing and executing educational programs for handicapped
children . . . [but] imposes significant requirements to be followed in the discharge of that
responsibility.” Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982). Rowley determined the
requirement to provide a FAPE is satisfied by providing personalized services and the Act
“cannot be read as imposing any particular substantive education standard upon the States.” Id.
at 200. The Court concluded the choice of educational theories and the manner in which
appropriate education is provided should be left to the legislatures with minimal court oversight.
Id. at 208.
51. EHA § 615(a).
52. Id. § 615 (b)(1).
53. Id.
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hearing and could appeal the result of that hearing to the state’s
54
educational agency. Parents had various rights at these hearings,
including the right to counsel and experts, the right to present
evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to receive written
copies of the proceedings.55 Another important protection was the socalled “stay-put” provision, which provided that “[d]uring the
pendency of any proceedings . . . the child shall remain in the then
current educational placement.”56 The stay-put provision prevented
school districts from taking unilateral action to change a child’s
placement.
In 1982, the Supreme Court issued its first decision interpreting
57
the EHA. After considering the many procedural safeguards, the
Court concluded that the requirements of the Act were merely “to
extend educational services first to those children who are receiving
no education and second to those children who are receiving an
‘inadequate education.’”58 The Act did not guarantee a substantive
standard of education aside from the basic requirement that the
services provide a sufficient benefit to enable the child to make
educational progress.59 Instead, the Court determined the EHA
evinced a primary intent to “require the States to adopt procedures
which would result in individualized consideration of and instruction
for each child.”60 The procedures of the IDEA ensure the substantive
content of the Act will be met.61 This focus on the procedural
safeguards of the EHA as the primary tool to enforce the substantive
educational rights of special education students has continued
throughout various amendments and reauthorizations as a primary

54. Id. § 615(b)(2)–615(c).
55. Id. § 615(d)–(e).
56. Id. § 615(e)(3). The 2004 amendments changed this provision by eliminating the
requirement when the change of placement is in a disciplinary context. See infra Part IV.A.
57. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
58. Id. at 189.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. In Board of Eductaion v. Rowley, the Supreme Court articulated this point:
When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied . . . are
contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions
contained in the Act, we think that the importance Congress attached to these
procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid. . . . We think that the congressional
emphasis upon [procedural safeguards] . . . demonstrates the legislative conviction
that adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure
much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.
Id. at 205–06 (emphasis added).
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focus of the IDEA, although later amendments blurred this sharp
focus.
C. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
In 1991, Congress changed the title of the EHA to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act “to reflect an ‘individuals
62
first’ approach.” The IDEA was reauthorized in 1997 and again in
63
2004. Revisions to the Act continued to reflect congressional
emphasis on procedural safeguards for the rights of parents and
children. The IDEA requires each state educational agency to
“establish and maintain procedures . . . to ensure that children with
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards
with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education.”64
These procedural safeguards include those provided under the
original EHA, but also include more specific and detailed
requirements.65 For example, the specific contents of the prior written
notice that schools must provide to parents before implementing or
refusing to implement a change in the child’s educational plan are
spelled out explicitly in the statute.66 The notice must describe the
proposed action, detail the reasons for the proposal, and provide a
statement of parents’ rights and sources to contact to obtain
assistance in understanding their rights.67 In addition to providing
more detail regarding previously granted rights, the IDEA provides
additional safeguards not included in the original act, such as the right
to mediation and the requirement that state educational agencies
assist parents in filing complaints.68
Congress designed the IDEA’s procedural safeguards to ensure
that parents are aware of their due process rights and receive
meaningful opportunities to participate in decisions affecting their

62. NANCY LEE JONES & RICHARD N. APLING, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT: STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND SELECTED ISSUES 2 n.6 (2002), available at
usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/educ/topics/cr012503.pdf.
63. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17,
111 Stat. 37; Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108446, 118 Stat. 2647.
64. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
65. Compare EHA, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 615, 89 Stat. 773, 788–89 (1975), with IDEA, 20
U.S.C. § 1415.
66. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 1415(b).
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69
child’s education. In fact, without an express definition of FAPE,
Congress appears to have intended for the IDEA’s procedural
protections to serve as the primary method of enforcing the special
70
needs child’s right to an education. Yet despite the fact that the
procedural protections are an integral part of the act, the Supreme
Court decisions in Schaffer and Arlington narrowed these protections
and limited their effectiveness.

II. SCHAFFER V. WEAST
A. Background
The IDEA provides parents the right to seek an “impartial due
process hearing” conducted by the state or local educational agency
whenever they believe their child’s IEP is not appropriate.71 The
decision at such a hearing is based on the substantive standard of
72
whether the child is receiving a free and appropriate education. The
IDEA addresses many procedural aspects of these due process
73
hearings. It requires pleadings to contain specific elements, provides
parties the right to counsel and to present evidence,74 and enables
parents who are unsatisfied with the results of the hearing to bring
75
actions in state or federal courts. The IDEA, however, does not
speak directly to the issue of which party bears the burden of
persuasion at due process hearings.76
Courts interpreted this silence in different ways, as the circuits
split on the issue of which party had the burden of proof at a hearing

69. Torrie v. Cwayna, 841 F. Supp. 1434, 1441 (W.D. Mich. 1994); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415
(enumerating due process rights, including those for parents).
70. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982) (finding that Congress’s primary
intent was to adopt procedures allowing for the individualized consideration of each child rather
than to establish a standard for the education of special needs children).
71. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii) (requiring “a description of the nature of the problem” and “a
proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and available”).
74. Id. § 1415(h)(1)–(2).
75. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
76. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 531 (2005).
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77
challenging the adequacy of an IEP. In 2004, the Fourth Circuit
reaffirmed its position placing the burden on the moving party with
its decision in Schaffer, which highlighted the schism and opened the
78
door for the Supreme Court to issue a conclusive answer.

B. The Schaffer Decision
Brian Schaffer experienced learning disabilities and speechlanguage impairments. He attended a private school until seventh
grade, when school officials told his mother he needed a school that
could better accommodate his needs.79 After conducting evaluations

77. The Second, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits found the burden of proof was properly
placed on the schools to demonstrate that the IEP was providing a FAPE. See Walczak v. Fla.
Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[S]chool authorities have the burden of
supporting the proposed IEP”); E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir.
1998) (“At the administrative level, the District clearly had the burden of proving that it had
complied with the IDEA.”); Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533 (3d Cir. 1995)
(citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (imposing the burden of proof
at administrative hearings on school districts, at least for mainstreaming compliance issues,
because of the statutory purpose of the IDEA and practical considerations regarding the school
district’s informational advantage)); Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398
(9th Cir. 1994) (“The school clearly had the burden of proving at the administrative hearing that
it complied with the IDEA.”).
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits held that the burden of proof was
properly imposed on the party challenging the IEP in a due process hearing, typically the
parents. See Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding the
burden rests with the “complaining party”); Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1466 (6th Cir.
1990) (declining to depart from the “traditional” burden of proof); Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding the burden rests with the party attacking the
IEP); Speilberg v. Henrico County Pub. Sch., 853 F.2d 256, 58 n.2 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding the
burden is on the party challenging the state administrative decision); Alamo Heights Indep. Sch.
Dist. V. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding the burden is on the
party attacking the IEP).
The D.C. Circuit’s stance was unclear. In 1985, the court placed the burden of proof on
the school districts when there were procedural deficiencies in an IEP. McKenzie v. Smith, 771
F.2d 1527, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Three years later, however, the D.C. Circuit again considered
the issue and interpreted its previous decision as placing the burden on party bringing suit—the
party that lost the administrative hearing. Kerhmam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir.
1988). In the earlier case, the school district had lost in the administrative hearing below, but in
the later case the burden of proof was on the parents because they were attempting to overturn
the administrative decision. Id.
State courts also joined the fray, increasing the confusion. E.g., Lascari v. Bd. of Educ.,
560 A.2d 1180, 1188 (N.J. 1989) (placing the burden of proof on the school districts because of
their expertise and informational advantages over parents).
78. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 452–53 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing the circuit split on
the burden of proof issue before placing the burden of proof on the moving party in IDEA
cases—typically the parent).
79. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. at 533.
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and IEP team meetings, the school district offered Brian placement in
80
either of two middle schools. Brian’s parents, however, enrolled
Brian in another private school, believing that he needed more
intensive services and smaller classes. They then sought compensation
for the cost of his private education in a due process hearing
challenging the adequacy of the IEP.81 Because the administrative law
judge determined the evidence was “truly in ‘equipoise,’” at the due
82
process hearing, the assignment of the burden of proof was
determinative of the outcome of the case.
The IDEA does not assign the burden of persuasion; thus, the
Supreme Court began with the default rule, placing the burden on
plaintiffs.83 Because decisions placing the burden of persuasion on the
opposing party from the outset of litigation are very rare, the Court
concluded that without a persuasive reason to believe Congress
intended the burden to shift in IDEA cases, the burden would lie with
the plaintiffs.84 The Supreme Court found that a “great deal is already
spent on the administration” of the IDEA, and thus, any marginal
dollars should be spent on the provision of educational services, not
litigation.85 Assuming that an IEP is invalid unless a school district
proves otherwise—the effect of placing the burden of persuasion on
school districts—would counteract the presumptions of the IDEA,
which relies heavily upon school districts’ expertise in order to meet
its goals.86 As an example of this presumption, the Court cited the
“stay-put” provision, which requires a student to remain in the “thencurrent educational placement” during a hearing, because a child’s
current educational placement is usually the one designated by the
87
school district.
The Court found the parents’ most plausible argument was a
fairness argument: the school districts have an advantage in
information, expertise, and resources and therefore should bear the
88
burden of persuasion. It concluded, however, that Congress already

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 535–36.
Id. at 536.
Id.
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addressed this informational advantage when it created safeguards for
the procedural rights of parents, requiring schools to share all
89
information with them. Accordingly, the Court held that the party
seeking relief properly bears the burden of proof at administrative
90
hearings under the IDEA.
C. Implications
Although many parents, advocates, and their attorneys argue
that Schaffer “risks inviting school districts to ignore or undermine
[parents’] rights and deprive their children of a free appropriate
public education,”91 once the realities of the educational laws and
litigation process are considered, the decision will likely not have
much effect on IDEA litigation in all but one area—the need for
expert witnesses. First, the outcome of very few cases will actually
depend on which party bears the burden of persuasion because very
few cases are truly in equipoise after the presentation of evidence.92
Additionally, Schaffer will not have an effect on IDEA litigation in all
jurisdictions. Schaffer left states the option of legislatively placing the
burden of proof on school districts.93 Several states already have laws
or regulations which place the burden of proof on the school
94
districts. Moreover, the decision will not affect litigation in

89. Id.
90. Id. at 536–37.
91. Amicus Committee Statement of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, supra note 8.
92. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 535 (“In truth . . . very few cases will be in evidentiary
equipoise.”); see also Peter W.D. Wright, How Will Schaffer v. Weast Affect You? (2005)
(unpublished manuscript at 7), available at http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/art/schaffer.impact.
pwright.pdf (“In general, what controls outcome is not the facts nor the law. It comes down to
one thing: Does the Hearing Officer/Administrative Law Judge want to rule in your
favor? . . . It is the human emotions of the HO/ALJ and your ability to influence their beliefs
and emotions [that] will take you into the end zone, without regard to which side has the burden
of proof.”). This conclusion was supported by an ALJ in an unrelated IDEA hearing. He stated,
“while the parties seemed to place great emphasis on the issue of burden of proof, my decision
would remain unchanged even if I had determined that the [school district] carried the burden.”
Waller v. Bd. of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 2d 531, 538 (D. Md. 2002) (quoting the ALJ decision).
93. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. 537 (“Finally, respondents and several States urge us to decide that
States may, if they wish, override the default rule and put the burden always on the school
district. Several States have laws or regulations purporting to do so, at least under some
circumstances. Because no such law or regulation exists in Maryland, we need not decide this
issue today.”).
94. States that statutorily placed the burden of proof on the school district are Alabama,
Alaska, Connecticut, Washington, D.C., Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, and
West Virginia. Wright, supra note 92, at 1, 3–4; e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.090(7) (2003);
MINN. STAT. § 125A.091(16) (2007).
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jurisdictions that already placed the burden of proof on the parents
95
before Schaffer. Thus, the decision only affects about half the
states.96
Schaffer may even benefit parents in one type of IDEA hearing.
Previously, when school districts unilaterally changed a child’s IEP,
parents had the choice of either accepting that IEP or requesting a
hearing. When parents did request a hearing, administrative law
judges often assumed that the parents were the party seeking change
because they had requested the hearing—even when the school
district was the one attempting to change the IEP.97 This led to the
placement of the burden of persuasion on parents too frequently.
After Schaffer, when a school district unilaterally attempts to change
an IEP, courts consider it the party “seeking relief,” and therefore the
district bears the burden of proof.98
A final reason that Schaffer, alone, is unlikely to have a large
impact is that attorneys do not tend to exert less effort in litigation
simply because their party does not bear the burden of proof. It is
always in advocates’ interest to present their best possible case in
hopes of prevailing.99 Thus, the hearing process is unlikely to change
solely because parents bear the burden of proof as attorneys will
continue to present as compelling a case as possible. Before Schaffer,
plaintiffs often requested to present their cases first, even when they
did not bear the burden of proof; if school districts were required to
present first, hearings would take much longer because districts would
have to anticipate plaintiffs’ cases.100

95. According to Wright’s research, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits had all previously allocated the burden of proof to the parents. Wright, supra note 92,
at 3. Thus, the states that will not be affected by Schaffer are Colorado, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Wright, supra note 92, at 3–4;
see also supra note 77.
96. Wright, supra note 92, at 3–4.
97. Id. at 5.
98. See id. at 5 (“[Previously,] parents had the burden of proving that the new proposed
IEP was not appropriate. The decision in Schaffer changed this.”); see also Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at
532 (stating that school districts may seek IDEA hearings and thus bear the burden of
persuasion “if they wish to change an existing IEP but the parents do not consent, or if parents
refuse to allow their child to be evaluated”).
99. See Wright, supra note 92, at 6 (“I always go first. This gives me control over the order
of witnesses, and allows me to lay out the case and theme of the case in the manner I prefer.”).
100. See Wright, supra note 92, at 6–7 (describing hearings in other jurisdictions—which did
not previously assign the burden of proof to the parents—where Wright asked to go first even
when the school district had the burden of proof). When hearing officers refused to allow
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Although it imposes a legal burden on the parents, Schaffer is
unlikely to have much effect on the way litigation actually progresses
in all but one area: expert witness testimony. Schaffer places a
substantial burden on parents by increasing their need for expert
witnesses. Placing the burden of persuasion on parents in IDEA
proceedings requires parents to retain their own experts to counter
the presumption that a child’s IEP is appropriate. Because parents
have the burden of proving the inappropriateness of the IEP—
formulated by the school district’s experienced teachers and special
education experts—they will often have to provide exceptionally
qualified and credible medical or education experts in order to prevail
at a FAPE hearing.101
As school districts typically have experts on staff in the form of
special education teachers, child psychologists, and educational
specialists,102 they have ready access to experts who will support the
IEP provided for the child without incurring exorbitant fees for the
retention of expert witnesses. Additionally, school districts have much
more experience in creating IEPs and educating special needs
children. It may be very difficult for parents to overcome judicial
deference to the school districts, and indeed may be a nearly
impossible task for parents to accomplish without the testimony of

Wright to present his case first, it resulted in much longer trials because the school district had
to anticipate every issue that could arise in the parents’ case and therefore attempted to cover
every possible issue. Id.
101. See Brief for The Council of Parent Attorneys & Advocates as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 3, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006) (No.
05-18) (“Because, as this Court recently ruled [in Schaffer], parents bear the burden of proving
that an appropriate IEP is not being provided for their children, and because the presentation of
expert evidence is an indispensable part of the process of proof, . . . the Court should not accord
a prevailing party an empty victory by forcing the parents to bear the costs of experts, without
whose help, they would not have obtained a free appropriate public education for their
children.”); Kathryn H. Crary, Comment, Necessary Expertise: Allowing Parents to Recover
Expert Witness Fees Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 77 TEMP. L. REV.
967, 968 (2004) (“[T]he use of expert witnesses in these IDEA actions is both necessary and
costly. Before filing suit against a school district, special education attorneys recommend that
parents obtain ‘strong, believable’ expert witness testimony, because such testimony . . . is
generally necessary to rebut a school district’s assertion that a child is receiving a ‘free
appropriate public education.’”).
102. For example, school districts often have autism specialists, program specialists,
inclusion specialists, occupational therapists, speech pathologists, and physical therapists, to
name a few of the many possible educational specialists.
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103
their own expert witnesses. It was exactly this aspect of IDEA
litigation the Supreme Court addressed next.

III. ARLINGTON V. MURPHY
A. Background
Although the amendments to the IDEA allow parents who
prevail in an action against a school district to recover attorneys’
104
fees, the original version of the Act did not include any such
provision.105 Parents, however, often brought actions for recovery of
costs in IDEA cases under other statutes that related to disabled
children’s right to a FAPE and provided for attorneys’ fees for
prevailing plaintiffs.106 In 1984, the Supreme Court foreclosed that
possibility by holding explicitly that parents could not use other
107
statutes to recover attorneys’ fees under the IDEA. In response,
Congress enacted the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of
1986, which made attorneys’ fees recoverable by prevailing parents.108
Congress applied the statute retroactively, demonstrating its
commitment to the protection of parents’ procedural rights in IDEA
litigation by allowing them to recover even expenses previously
109
incurred.
The IDEA provides courts discretion to “award reasonable
attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to parents of a child with a

103. See Experts Divided over Significance of Expert Fees Ruling, SPECIAL EDUCATOR
(LRP Publ’ns, Alexandria, Va.), July 21, 2006, at 4 (“With rare exception, parents must offer the
testimony of expert witnesses in order to prevail in administrative due process proceedings.”
(quoting attorney Steven Wyner)).
104. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2004).
105. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA), Pub. L. 94-142
§ 3(b)(2)–(5), 89 Stat. 774.
106. See Stefan R. Hanson, Buckhannon, Special Education Disputes, and Attorneys’ Fees:
Time for a Congressional Response Again, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 519, 531–32 (remarking that
although the EHA had no attorneys’ fees provision, parents often recovered their fees under
other statutes). The most frequently used statutes were the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). See Crary, supra note 101, at 973.
107. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1015 (1984).
108. Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372 § 2(B), 100 Stat.
796.
109. Id. § 5; see also Mitchell L. Yell & Christine A. Espin, The Handicapped Children’s
Protection Act of 1986: Time to Pay the Piper?, 56 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 396, 401–02 (1990)
(discussing the effect of retroactive application).
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110
disability when they are the prevailing party. This language is
similar to attorneys’ fees provisions in other federal statutes.111 Yet
the IDEA is even more detailed, including specific fee-calculating
provisions prohibiting the use of any bonus or multiplier, as well as
the recovery of fees or costs for certain services.112 Notably absent
from the IDEA, however, is any provision for the recovery of fees
paid to expert witnesses during the litigation. When courts considered
actions for the recovery of costs under the IDEA, the attorneys’ fees
provision gave rise to a division among the circuits as to whether the
113
provision included expert fees in addition to attorneys’ fees. The
Second Circuit joined the debate in 2005, allowing prevailing parents
to recover expert fees,114 and gave the Supreme Court its second
opportunity to consider a technical, procedural IDEA issue during
the 2005–2006 term.

B. The Arlington Decision
Pearl and Theodore Murphy brought a suit seeking to compel
the Arlington Central School District Board of Education to pay
private school tuition for their special needs son, Joseph.115
Throughout the proceedings, the Murphys were assisted by an
116
education consultant whom they paid $29,350 for her services. Upon
prevailing on their substantive claims, the Murphys then sought to
recover the fees they paid to their expert.117

110. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 2004).
111. See Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 593 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000)
(comparing the IDEA attorneys’ fees provision to 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C)–(D).
113. Compare Arons v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that
although non-lawyers could not recover attorneys’ fees despite acting as counsel, experts fell
within the confines of the statute), and Brillon v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 274 F. Supp. 2d 864,
872 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that expert fees are recoverable in IDEA actions), and B.D. v.
DeBuono, 177 F. Supp. 2d 201, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that Congress intended expert fees
to be recoverable under the IDEA), with Goldring ex rel. Anderson v. District of Columbia, 416
F.3d 70, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that expert fees are not recoverable in IDEA actions), and
T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist., No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 482 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that expert fees
are not recoverable because there is no explicit authorization in the IDEA), and Neosho R-V
Sch. Dist. v. Clarke, 315 F.2d 1022, 1033 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that expert fees are not
recoverable in IDEA actions), and Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified Sch. Dist., 2004 WL 4999156,
at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004) (holding that expert fees not recoverable).
114. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 332, 339 (2d Cir. 2005).
115. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2006).
116. Id. at 2458.
117. Id. at 2457–58.
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Basing its analysis on the premise that Congress enacted the
IDEA under its Spending Clause authority, the Supreme Court
determined the Act does not permit prevailing parents to recover fees
118
paid to their expert witnesses. When imposing conditions on
disbursements of federal money to the states pursuant to its spending
clause authority, Congress must set out the conditions attached to
these grants unambiguously, and states must accept such conditions
voluntarily and knowingly.119 The Court concluded that the language
of the IDEA attorneys’ fees provision does not provide states with
any warning that expert fees may be included within the costs
recoverable by the parents, but merely adds attorneys’ fees to the
types of costs that are typically recoverable in litigation.120 Moreover,
because the IDEA contains very detailed provisions regarding
specific fees that are and are not recoverable as part of attorneys’
fees, the absence of any similar provisions pertaining to expert fees
indicates they are not authorized by the statute.121 Absent language in
the statute requiring the recovery of expert fees, the Court
determined states do not have the necessary clear notice required to
attach a condition to the grant of federal money.122
The Court also analogized to cases regarding Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d), which authorizes the award of costs to a
prevailing party, and the fee-shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988
123
governing civil rights actions. In such cases, the Court had
determined that nearly identical language in attorneys’ fees
provisions did not include expert fees absent express authorization by
Congress.124
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that reimbursing
prevailing parents for expert fees furthers the IDEA’s primary goal.
It determined that the goal of providing a free appropriate education
did not prevail over other considerations, such as a school district’s

118. Id. at 2458–64.
119. Id. at 2459.
120. Id. at 2459–60. For a list of typically recoverable costs, see 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2000).
121. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2460–61.
122. Id.; see also W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 89 & n.4 (1991) (drawing the
same conclusion and listing thirty-five federal statutes that explicitly include expert fees in
addition to attorneys’ fees).
123. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2462.
124. Id. (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 439 (1987) and
Casey, 499 U.S. at 102).

04__THOMASON.DOC

476

12/6/2007 8:54:11 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:457

125
monetary concerns. In light of the statute’s plain text, the Court
found the legislative intent that expert fees be recoverable by
prevailing parties unpersuasive.126 Accordingly, the Court determined
that prevailing parents could not recover fees paid to expert witnesses
127
and consultants as part of their costs in IDEA actions.

IV. UNDERMINING THE IDEA
Although Arlington appears to be in line with previous Spending
128
Clause cases requiring clear notice of recoverable costs, and
Schaffer is consistent with other cases placing the burden of
persuasion on the party seeking relief,129 the impacts of the decisions
are compounded significantly when the cases are evaluated together.
The decisions have a combined effect that undermines the goals of
the IDEA and the rationale used by the Supreme Court in the
decisions themselves. First, Arlington and Schaffer, along with the
2004 reauthorization of the IDEA, represent a distinct departure
from prior trends in the Act and its supporting body of case law,
which consistently indicated increasing support for rights of parents
and students. Second, the decision in Arlington undermines the
Supreme Court’s rationale for placing the burden of proof upon
parents in Schaffer. Finally, the decisions ignore the realities of the
litigation process and the characteristics of many special education
parents by imposing unreasonable obstacles in the way of parents’
attempts to exercise their due process rights.
A. Bucking the Trend
Prior to 2004, congressional amendments to the IDEA and
judicial interpretations of the Act established a trend of increasing

125. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2463.
126. Id. The House Report stated, “The conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as
part of the costs’ include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable
costs of any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the . . .
case.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986).
127. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2457–58.
128. Experts Divided over Significance of Expert Fees Ruling, supra note 103, at 4; see also
Casey, 499 U.S. at 102 (finding that expert fees are not recoverable in a § 1988 action); Crawford
Fitting, 482 U.S. at 439 (finding that expert fees are not recoverable absent explicit
authorization).
129. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999) (placing the
burden on the party seeking relief); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999) (same); St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (same).
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support for the rights of parents and students, substantively and
especially procedurally. These amendments to the IDEA provided
increasing amounts of money for special education and significantly
expanded the group of students eligible for services under the Act by
130
including additional disabilities. Additionally, the Act focused on
increasing the services available to preschool-aged children in an
attempt to keep them from falling too far behind before beginning
school.131
U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the IDEA prior to 2004
consistently supported the increasing scope of substantive and
procedural rights of children with disabilities—and their parents as
well. In 1984, the Supreme Court required a school district to provide
services for clean intermittent catheterization during the school day
to a student with disabilities as a “related service” in order to allow
132
her to attend school. One year later, the Court determined that
parents are entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition and
expenses even when they take unilateral action to place their child in
that school—technically violating the stay-put provision during a
dispute with the school district—if a court later determines the
parents’ placement was appropriate and the school district’s
placement was inappropriate.133 In its next IDEA case, the Court
decided that as a result of the stay-put provision and the strong
presumption in favor of keeping children in their current educational
placements, a school district may not suspend or expel a violent or
disruptive child with disabilities without following the due process
procedures of the IDEA.134
Other Supreme Court decisions determined that parents may be
reimbursed for the costs of unilaterally placing a child with disabilities
in a private school that provides an appropriate education even when

130. See RICHARD N. APLING, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
(IDEA): CURRENT FUNDING TRENDS 1 (2004), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=key_workplace (stating that since 1995, “overall
IDEA funding has increased by nearly 250%, from $3.2 billion to $11.2 billion” due to increases
in the number of children served).
131. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, 100 Stat.
1145 (expanding preschool programs significantly and emphasizing the early education focus of
the act).
132. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 893 (1984).
133. Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1985).
134. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328 (1988). This protection was later removed by Congress
in the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA. See infra text accompanying note 142.
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135
the school is not approved by the state and that children entitled to
IDEA services may be provided those public services by sectarian
schools without violating the First Amendment.136 In its last IDEA
case before Schaffer, the Supreme Court determined that school
districts must provide one-on-one nursing services to students with
serious disabilities if those services are necessary in order to allow
137
them to attend school. With one exception, every time the Supreme
Court considered an IDEA issue, it found in favor of the parents and
students with disabilities, protecting rights by increasing the
138
responsibilities of the school districts. The sole exception is Smith v.
Robinson,139 which Congress overturned almost immediately.140 Lower
courts followed the example of the Supreme Court, consistently
increasing the substantive and procedural rights of parents and
children.141 These decisions, along with the series of amendments to
the IDEA, evinced a trend of increasing substantive and procedural
rights afforded to children with disabilities and their parents.
The tide turned in 2004. The reauthorization of the IDEA that
year displayed a different focus, as Congress cut back on many of the
procedural safeguards that had been the cornerstones of the act. The
reauthorized version of the IDEA narrowed the scope of the stay-put
provision significantly by giving the local education agency the
authority to remove a child to an interim placement upon the
determination that the child would be a danger in the current
142
This change to the stay-put provision
educational setting.
specifically contradicts the holding in Honig v. Doe, which found that
the provision prohibits school districts from removing children from
school simply by claiming they are dangerous.143 Another amendment

135. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 9 (1993).
136. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
137. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 68, 79 (1999).
138. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text.
139. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1015 (1984).
140. See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Mackey v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.3d 158, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2004) (allowing parents
to recover the costs of tuition because to do otherwise would be inherently unfair); Oberti v. Bd.
of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that children must be placed in a regular
classroom with support services and modifications whenever there is any way they can be
educated satisfactorily, and if not that efforts must be made to include the children whenever
possible); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3068 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25,
2005) (allowing parents to recover fees despite prevailing on only some issues at the hearing).
142. IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3)–(4) (Supp. IV 2004).
143. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323–24 (1988).
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in the reauthorized Act allows school districts to recover attorneys’
144
fees from parents upon prevailing in IDEA actions. School districts
may recover fees whenever a parent’s complaint is frivolous,
unreasonable, presented for an improper purpose, or intended to
needlessly delay or increase the cost of litigation.145 Even though
school districts may not recover without “bad faith” actions on the
part of the parents, this is a significant change in the IDEA, which
had always focused on protecting the rights of the parents and
students, not the districts.
After these revisions took effect on July 1, 2005, the Supreme
Court issued its decisions in Schaffer and Arlington, the first IDEA
decisions to come down in favor of school districts by further
narrowing the procedural safeguards and rights of parents. It is
unclear whether the Supreme Court will continue this trend limiting
the procedural safeguards for parents in IDEA litigation.146
B. Undermining Schaffer’s Rationale
1. The Insurmountable Burden of Proof. In its Schaffer opinion,
the Supreme Court cited the many procedural safeguards of the
IDEA as a major factor in its decision to impose the burden of

144. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)–(III) (Supp. IV 2004).
145. Id.
146. As noted, Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007), may at first
glance appear to go against the trend of limiting procedural rights. See supra note 23. The
Court’s opinion in Winkelman, however, focused primarily on a textual, plain meaning reading
of the IDEA, stating that it “defines one of its purposes as seeking ‘to ensure that the rights of
children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.’” Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at
2002 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2004)). Thus, although the Court found in
favor of the parents in this case, rather than the school district as in Schaffer and Arlington, the
decision gives no indication that the court will do so in regards to any future procedural rights
which are subject to interpretation rather than explicitly stated in the IDEA. Moreover, as
attorneys’ fees are recoverable under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), Winkelman
does not provide a new economic benefit to parents. Parents with meritorious claims, even those
with low income levels, would likely be able to find counsel to represent their interests on a
contingency basis due to the ability to recover their fees upon success. Thus, although decided in
favor of the parents, Winkelman remains a hollow victory as it does nothing to reduce the
difficulties parents face following Schaffer and Arlington because they still must carry the
burden of persuasion at IDEA hearings while being unable to recover expert fees.
The Supreme Court will have yet another opportunity to consider an IDEA issue in its
fall 2007 term. In Board of Education v. Tom F., the Court will decide whether parents may be
reimbursed for tuition when students receive special education services from private schools
even if the students never received services from public schools. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on February 26, 2007. 127 S. Ct. 1393 (2007).
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147
persuasion on the party seeking relief in IDEA litigation. The Court
reasoned that carrying the burden of proof will not harm parents
because their rights are sufficiently protected by these procedural
148
safeguards. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the safeguards
are sufficient to eliminate the school district’s informational
advantage.149 When examined in light of its subsequent decision in
Arlington, however, the individual safeguards cited by the Court will
not adequately protect parent or student rights in IDEA actions.
The first safeguard cited by the Supreme Court is the right of
parents to have expert witnesses and opinions at IDEA hearings. The
provisions of the IDEA and federal regulations explicitly
acknowledge the necessity of expert witnesses by providing parents
the right to an “independent educational evaluation of the[ir] child”
150
at public expense. The Court in Schaffer emphasized this provision,
saying the

IDEA thus ensures parents access to an expert who can evaluate all
the materials that the school must make available, and who can give
an independent opinion. They are not left to challenge the
government without a realistic opportunity to access the necessary
evidence, or without an expert with the firepower to match the
151
opposition.

The Court thus recognized the necessity of parents having their own
expert to match the school district. Yet, despite stressing the
importance of expert evidence, the Supreme Court seven months
later in Arlington essentially took away any practical access to this
right by eliminating all possibilities of financial assistance for parents
who retain experts. Parents are unlikely to find an expert who will
work without the possibility of recovering fees from the school district
upon prevailing. This decision effectively restricts the possibility of

147. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 534–35 (2005).
148. Id.; see Susan Boswell, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds School Districts in Special Ed Case,
ASHA LEADER, Dec. 27, 2005, http://www.asha.org/about/publications/leader-online/archives/
2005/051227/051227c.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2007) (stating that the “[t]he ruling
recognizes . . . that recent IDEA reauthorizations have strengthened procedural safeguards”
because parents may have experts to match the school districts’ experts).
149. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 536.
150. Id. For the IDEA’s statutory provision of this expert evaluation, see IDEA, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2004). The Code of Federal Regulations provides guidelines to assist
states in their interpretations of the right to an expert evaluation. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1)
(2007).
151. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 536.
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retaining experts—and therefore bringing cases—to only wealthy
parents. Thus, although Schaffer stresses the opportunities for parents
to use experts as a reason to place the burden of persuasion on
parents at IDEA hearings, Arlington essentially eliminates any
feasible chance of realizing that opportunity.
Another procedural safeguard emphasized in Schaffer was the
attorneys’ fees provision. The Court stated, “[f]inally, and perhaps
most importantly, parents may recover attorneys’ fees if they
152
prevail.” At the time of this statement, many courts around the
country included expert fees in the attorneys’ fees parents could
recover upon prevailing. The holding in Arlington, which eliminated
that possibility, therefore significantly changed and reduced the scope
of the safeguard on which the Court placed the most importance in its
decision to shift the burden of proof to parents in IDEA litigation.
2. Undermining Congressional Intent.
In addition to
undermining parents’ ability to overcome imposition of the burden of
proof, the Arlington decision contradicts congressional intent,
another rationale used to impose the burden of proof on parents in
Schaffer. The Schaffer Court reasoned that Congress already had
considered the many disadvantages parents face when challenging
school districts in IDEA actions and included sufficient procedural
protections in drafting the Act to compensate for those
disadvantages.153 The Court’s decision in Arlington, however,
contradicts one of the protections Congress appears to have intended
to include when drafting the IDEA. Two different versions of the bill
were introduced in the Senate as it considered amending the EHA to
provide for the recovery of attorneys’ fees by prevailing parents. The
first provided that “the court, in its discretion, may award a
reasonable attorney’s fee [as part of the costs]” to prevailing
parents.154 The second version of the bill would have provided for the
recovery of “a reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable witness fees, and
other reasonable expenses of the civil action” to the prevailing
parents, but also would have set a cap on the total costs that could be
recovered.155 Although the record shows no objections to the types of
costs included in the second bill, there were several objections to the

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 537.
Id. at 536–37.
S. REP. NO. 99-112, at 15 (1985).
Id. at 7.
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156
cap on the amount of recoverable fees. This conflict led to the
introduction of an alternative, compromise bill, which granted courts
discretion to provide a “reasonable attorney’s fee in addition to the
costs” to prevailing parents. When explaining the effect this version
of the bill would have, Senator Lowell Weicker stated that the intent
of the Senate was to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees, necessary
expert witness fees, and other reasonable expenses which were
necessary for parents to vindicate their claim to a free appropriate
public education for their handicapped child.”157 There was no
158
opposition to this statement, and the bill passed in the Senate.
Similar intent to include expert fees was revealed in the House of
Representatives when a new version of the bill was introduced
allowing for the recovery of “reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses and
159
costs.” The House Report stated, “[t]he phrase ‘expenses and costs’
160
includes expenses of expert witnesses . . . .”
These statements indicate each chamber’s intent to provide for
the recovery of expert fees in addition to attorneys’ fees. In the joint
conference on the final version of the bill, legislators gave courts
161
discretion to “award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs.”
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference
said:

The conferees intend that the term “attorneys’ fees as part of the
costs” include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and
the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is found to be
necessary for the preparation of the parent or guardian’s case in the
action or proceeding, as well as traditional costs incurred in the
162
course of litigating a case.

When the legislative history is considered, it appears that
Congress intended to provide for the inclusion of expert and
attorneys’ fees in the amendment to the EHA. Thus, Arlington

156. See id. Significantly, this objection to a cap on the amount of recoverable fees again
demonstrates Congress’s commitment to protecting the interests of children with disabilities and
their parents by providing the opportunity for parents to recover all of their expenses, not only a
portion.
157. 131 CONG. REC. 21390 (statement of Sen. Weicker) (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 21390–93.
159. H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 1, 5 (1985).
160. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
161. H.R. REP. NO. 99-687 (1986).
162. Id. (emphasis added).
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eliminates a substantial procedural safeguard Congress intended to
include in the IDEA to protect parents involved in litigation with
school districts, which have significantly greater information,
resources, and expertise. By reducing parents’ available procedural
safeguards, the Court’s decision in Arlington undermines the
rationale in Schaffer, which found the expansive procedural
safeguards in the IDEA justified the imposition of the burden of
proof on parents in IDEA litigation.
C. The Combined Effect of the Decisions in Light of Demographic
Information
The effect of the decisions in Schaffer and Arlington will have a
significant impact on parents of children with disabilities. As
discussed in Part II.D, the primary way Schaffer will affect IDEA
litigation is by increasing parents’ need for expert witnesses. Once
parents have the burden of proof at a hearing—making the use of
experts a practical necessity in order to overcome the presumption
that the school district’s IEP is correct—not allowing parents to
recover fees paid to experts severely limits their ability to bring an
action.
The impact of these decisions becomes even more significant
upon consideration of the demographics of special education
students’ households. Although the employment patterns of parents
of special education students are essentially the same as parents of
non–special needs children, they tend to earn less.163 More than onethird of students with disabilities live in households with annual
incomes less than $25,000, and one-quarter of students with
disabilities live in poverty.164 Additionally, only half as many children
with disabilities live in households with more than $75,000 in annual
165
income as do other children. This likely occurs because both
mothers and fathers of students with disabilities tend to have much
166
lower levels of education than the parents of other students. Finally,
approximately one-quarter of students with disabilities receive money

163. MARY WAGNER ET AL., THE CHILDREN WE SERVE: THE DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS 24, 28 (2002), available at http://www.seels.net/designdocs/SEELS_
Children_We_Serve_Report.pdf.
164. Id. at 28.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 23.
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from at least one governmental benefit program, such as Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families, food stamps, or Supplemental
167
Security Income. Overall, although the parents of children with
disabilities are as likely to work as parents of typical children, they
are much more likely to have a very low income level, live in poverty,
and receive federal assistance.168
This demographic information illustrates that the majority of
parents with children in special education do not have sufficient
income to hire expert witnesses necessary to carry their burden of
proof at IDEA hearings. Given the high average cost of expert
services,169 it is not only these low-income families burdened by the
change in the IDEA procedural law, but also the many middle-class
families who do not have disposable income on hand to hire an
expert. Moreover, parents of special education students are especially
likely to need expert advice and consultation throughout the process
due to their lower-than-average levels of education. It is thus the
group most likely to need assistance in IDEA hearings that suffers
the greatest harm as a result of Arlington.170
In contrast to the significant burden it can impose on parents’
finances, litigating due process complaints is not the large drain on
school districts’ educational budgets that the Court seems to
171
suggest. Although attorneys for school districts proclaim that the
172
decision “will save the taxpayers a lot of money,” parents actually
request civil hearings very rarely. Only five out of every ten thousand
children who receive special education services under the IDEA

167. Id. at 30.
168. Id. at 47.
169. See Crary, supra note 101, at 968 (“[T]he use of expert witnesses in these IDEA actions
is both necessary and costly.”). For example, in Arlington, parents sought reimbursement for
$29,350 of expert fees and services. Arlington v. Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455,
2458 (2006).
170. See Experts Divided over Significance of Expert Fees Ruling, supra note 103, at 4
(“[T]he ruling will most impact financially disadvantaged families who may be unable to find
experts who don’t seek to recover fees.”).
171. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 535 (2005) (“Litigating a due
process complaint is an expensive affair, costing schools approximately $8,000-to-$12,000 per
hearing.”). Although these cost figures may be accurate, these hearings occur very infrequently.
See infra text accompanying notes 173–74.
172. Experts Divided over Significance of Expert Fees Ruling, supra note 103, at 4 (quoting
Ron Wenkart, an attorney for the Orange County Office of Education in Costa Mesa, CA).
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173
request due process hearings. In fact, 94 percent of all school
districts have never had a single IDEA hearing, and the total amount
spent on all IDEA disputes represents only 0.3 percent of special
174
education spending. Thus, evidence suggests additional costs to
school districts from reimbursing expert fees will accrue very rarely,
whereas “[w]ithout the ability to recover their expert witness fees, few
parents could afford to exercise their constitutional and IDEA rights
to challenge [the] denial of FAPE to their children by school
districts.”175

CONCLUSION
Individually rational decisions in Schaffer and Arlington ignore
the realities of the litigation process and combine to impose an
unreasonable and nearly insurmountable burden on parents of special
education students. In order to carry the burden of persuasion in an
IDEA action, parents must present experts to counter the school
district’s expertise and informational advantage. Expecting parents to
present expert witnesses when they are not able to recover witness
fees is unrealistic, especially considering the average demographics of
parents of special education students. When considered in the context
of the history of the IDEA and its previous judicial interpretations,
the cases signify a shift in the Court’s mentality and a new willingness
to restrict the procedural rights and safeguards of parents—a shift
unintended by the legislators who drafted these provisions.
Yet, hope remains for special education parents. The Supreme
Court left legislatures with several opportunities to circumvent the
holdings in these cases and lessen the burden placed on parents. First,
in Schaffer, the Court left state legislatures the option of statutorily
placing the burden of proof on the school districts in IDEA
proceedings.176 By shifting the burden of proof to school districts,

173. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF FORMAL
DISPUTES ARE GENERALLY LOW AND STATES ARE USING MEDIATION AND OTHER
STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS 13 (2003).
174. Amicus Committee Statement of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, supra note 8. The
data come from Department of Education studies and involve costs spent on mediation, school
district hearings, and litigation. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of
2003, 150 CONG. REC. S5351 (May 12, 2004).
175. Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, COPAA Files Amicus Brief in Supreme
Court Advocating Upholding Right to Recover Expert Witness Fees, http://www.copaa.org/
news/murphy.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
176. See supra note 93.
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states would greatly reduce the need for expert witnesses, thereby
significantly lessening Arlington’s impact. Alternatively, Arlington left
the door open for Congress to mitigate the burdens placed on parents
by these decisions, saying, “[t]he ball . . . is properly left in Congress’
court to provide, if it so elects, for consultant fees and testing
expenses beyond those IDEA and its implementing regulations
177
already authorize.” If Congress amends the IDEA to provide for
the recovery of expert witness fees, parents with valid claims against
school districts would be more likely to find expert witnesses to
support their cause, because they would be able to guarantee
payment of fees upon prevailing in the action.178
Such reforms are crucial to protect the accessibility of education
for all students, which the Court recognized as a profoundly
important tool for the nation’s success in Brown v. Board of
179
Education more than fifty years ago. Despite the vast improvements
in educational opportunities since Brown, especially in special
education services, there is still plenty of room for improvement and
more must be done to ensure every child has the opportunity to
receive a “free appropriate public education.” Courts and legislatures
must consider the realities of the litigation process and give parents
the necessary tools with which to fight for their children’s education.
When parents must pay for their own experts in order to satisfy the
burden of proof in a hearing to guarantee their child’s free and
appropriate education, that education is no longer free, but rather
carries very high costs.180

177. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2006) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
178. Although some parents might still be deterred by having to front the costs for experts,
this deterrence could actually prove to be beneficial as it would serve as a method to weed out
less meritorious claims or to encourage settlements. Parents with legitimate claims, however,
should still be able to find expert witnesses who recognize the likelihood of prevailing on the
merits and therefore will be willing to accept the case on a contingency basis.
179. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
180. See Experts Divided over Significance of Expert Fees Ruling, supra note 103, at 4 (“All
too soon, we may find that only families that can afford to hire experts to help their failing
children will be able to enforce the rights and remedies secured by the IDEA. FAPE is no
longer ‘free.’”).

